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To answer these questions, I assemble a database that includes 20,202 publicly-traded firms in 47 countries. A company is identified as being connected with a politician if at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10% of voting shares) or one of its top directors (CEO, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party. I define close relationships in Section I. I find corporate political connections to be relatively widespread in that I find at least one connected firm in 35 of the 47 countries in my sample. However, the connections are not necessarily numerous: of the 20,202 firms in my sample, I identify less than 3% (i.e., 541) as being connected. As might be expected, connections are more widespread among larger firms: connected firms represent 7.72% of the world's stock market capitalization. In some of the countries, political connections are quite common. In Russia, for example, connected firms represent 86.75% of the market capitalization.
Generally, I find that connections are particularly common in countries that are perceived as being highly corrupt, in countries that impose restrictions on foreign investments by their citizens, and in more transparent systems. Connections are less common in the presence of more stringent regulation of political conflicts of interest. Note that these findings are descriptive in nature and do not imply any causality.
I perform an event study around the time of the announcements of directors or large shareholders entering politics, or of politicians joining boards, and I find a significant increase in corporate value, but only when those involved in business enter politics. Furthermore, the stock price impact of a new connection is larger whenever a businessperson is elected as prime minister, rather than as a member of the parliament, and whenever a shareholder, rather than a director, enters politics.
While I do not include either contributions to political campaigns or direct (undisclosed) payments to politicians, the connections that I document are likely to be more durable than one-time campaign contributions or cash payments.
I. Incidence of political connections.
A. Definition of connections.
I say a company is connected with a politician if one of the company's large shareholders or top directors is: (1) a member of parliament, (2) a minister or the head of state, or (3) is closely related to a top official.
A.1. Connections with members of parliament.
Firms may be connected through a member of parliament (MP) in two ways. First, at least one of their top directors may currently sit in the national parliament. As in Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Larry H. P. Lang (2000) and Mara Faccio and Larry H. P. Lang (2002) , top directors are defined as a company's CEO, president, vice-president, or secretary. For example, Lord Browne of Maddingley, a member of the British House of Lords, is the CEO of British Petroleum. BP is therefore classified as connected with a member of parliament through a director.
Second, companies are classified as connected when at least one large shareholder is a member of parliament. Large shareholders are defined as anyone directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of shareholder votes. A good example of this is one of the most influential families in Italy, the Agnelli family. Giovanni Agnelli had a life term as senator. Through a complex ownership structure, the Agnelli family directly or indirectly controls more than 10% of the votes in 18 Italian listed firms.
Those firms are all classified as connected with a member of parliament. A firm is not classified as connected if a family member of an MP is a large shareholder or a top director of a firm. Thus, although Giovanni Agnelli's brother Umberto is a top director of IFIL, this company is not considered connected through a director (but it is included in the sample because of Giovanni Agnelli's ownership).
A.2. Connections with a minister or head of state.
There are three types of connections with a minister or head of state: as director; as large shareholder; or through a relative. A relative may be a spouse, a child, a sibling, or a parent.
Ian MacFarlane, Australian Minister for Small Business, for example, is chairman of two Australian listed firms: Central Pacific Minerals and Southern Pacific Petroleum. These firms are therefore classified as connected with a minister (through a director). Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is the largest shareholder of four Italian listed firms: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, Mediaset, Mediolanum, and Standa. All these companies are defined as politically connected with a minister (through their owner). Finally, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir's son, Mirzan, and Silvio Berlusconi's daughter, Marina, are either controlling shareholders or top directors of several listed corporations. All of these connections are included.
A.3. Companies closely related to a top official.
Close relationships are a bit more ambiguous. Since they lack the definitional objectivity of the first two connection types, I place them in a separate category. Connections in this case occur when a large shareholder or a top director is: a friend of a minister or MP; a former minister; currently a politician, but has left the business after 1997; a foreign politician; or is a person known to be associated with a political party.
(i)
Cases of friendship are included if they are mentioned in The Economist, Forbes, or Fortune. (iv) The Agnelli family is an example of politicians who have large ownership in foreign firms.
(v) Well-known relationships with political parties are seen in the UMNO in Malaysia (see Edmund Terence Gomez and K.S. Jomo (1997) and Johnson and Mitton (2003) ).
The necessity of relying on publicly available sources for information on close relationships such as friendship or well-known cases of relationships with political parties produces an incomplete picture.
For example, no political connections are identified in Argentina (Table II) A few caveats are in order. First, the count of connections is far from comprehensive. For many countries, data on ownership are lacking, and families may control firms through nominee accounts or shell entities. Disclosure regulations also differ significantly across countries. To limit the impact of these factors, I investigate only large shareholders, i.e., those who control at least 10% of votes -a level of control that forces disclosure almost everywhere.
Second, in some countries, connections with local officials may be more important than connections with central government officeholders. There is no comprehensive and accurate information on identities of those local government officials. Finally, there are many ways to create a political connection. I focus on a direct measure of connections that is observable for all countries.
Other instruments, such as campaign contributions, are not observable for most countries.
II. Where are political connections more common?
To examine the incidence of connections in different countries, I identify a number of variables that are potentially associated with connectedness.
A. Variable definitions.
A.1. Connections.
I use two variables to measure the incidence of political connections at the country level. The second variable, % of firms connected with a minister or MP, is the number of firms connected with a minister or MP, excluding cases of close relationships, divided by the total number of firms listed in a country. This ratio ranges from a minimum of 0% for the same countries as above to a maximum of 12% in Russia. This index relies only on connections that can be objectively established. Since ratios of connected firms are by construction constrained to between 0 and 100%, the regression analysis in section II.B uses a two-boundary Tobit model (see Takeshi Amemiya (1984) for a discussion).
A.2. Regulatory environment.
A regulatory score is constructed based on regulations that prohibit or set limits on the business activities of public officials. The results are shown in Table III For ministers, I use the keywords: country name + "conflict* of interest*" + "minister*" as well as country name + "code conduct" + "minister*." From the websites of each parliament and government, I gather contact information (generally e-mail addresses), which I use to send a questionnaire concerning the specific conflicts of interest described below. My questionnaire is sent to each chamber of the parliament and at least three ministers, as well as to each country's securities regulatory authority.
Information from these sources is used to construct six regulatory sub-scores (numbered 1-6 below), an aggregate regulatory score, and a disclosure score for each country. These scores are presented from left to right in Table III . For the six regulatory sub-scores and for the disclosure score, a value of one is assigned if the country has at least one restriction in that category, and zero otherwise.
[ Table III goes about here] 1. Restrictions on ownership by members of parliament. Restrictions include both those that completely forbid MPs to hold stock, and those that allow MPs to hold stock in some instances. For example, the Brazilian Código de Ética forbids senators to own companies that would benefit from a contract with the government. Similarly, in Ireland, office holders are not allowed to have any financial interests that might conflict or be seen to conflict with their position.
Restrictions on board membership by MPs. Restrictions include those that completely forbid
MPs to sit on a board. This is the case in Chile, Portugal, and South Korea. I also consider partial restrictions, which allow MPs to sit on boards as long as the position is (i) not remunerated, (ii) does not represent a conflict of interest, or (iii) a waiver is granted. Partial restrictions apply in 13 countries. 5. Restrictions on board membership by ministers. In Australia, Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, ministers may not sit on a board. In some other countries, ministers are allowed to sit on boards as long as the position is (i) is not remunerated, (ii) is does not represent a conflict of interest (e.g., the company either has a contract with the state, or enjoys special privileges or concessions, or receives a regular state subsidy by virtue of a special law), or (iii) a waiver is granted.
6. Major restrictions on board membership or ownership by ministers expressed in the constitution.
Constitutional restrictions applying to ministers are more common than in the case of MPs, and show up in 14 countries.
I add these six scores together to create an aggregate score (regulatory score), which ranges from 0
for Belgium, the Czech Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan, and Venezuela, to 6 for Peru and the Philippines. 10 In addition to this restrictions-based variable, I include the dummy variable mandatory disclosure of assets, which takes the value of one if government officials are required to disclose personal assets, and zero otherwise. This variable is based on the Parline database and the questionnaires sent to the parliaments and governments.
I expect connections to be less common in countries with more stringent regulations (e.g., more widespread and stronger restrictions). The impact of disclosure rules is much less clear. On the one hand, disclosure may discourage connections, as it increases the likelihood that abuses are detected and punished. On the other hand, disclosure makes it more likely that connections are picked up in my sample. The correlation coefficient for restrictions and incidence of connections, reported in Table IV, shows that, as expected, restrictions are associated with a lower proportion of connections. Disclosure requirements are also associated with fewer connections, at least in the univariate results.
[ Table IV show that connections are positively related to corruption.
The second variable, quality of legal environment, is the average of efficiency of the judicial system and rule of law. The first is an assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms produced by the country-risk rating agency, Business
International Corporation. It may be taken to represent investors' assessments of conditions in the country in question. The index is scaled from 0 to 10; lower scores represent lower efficiency levels (see Paolo Mauro, 1995) . The Rule of law is an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk rating agency, International Country Risk. It also is scaled from 0 to 10, with lower scores for lower efficiency levels. 12 Ex-ante, one would expect countries with better legal systems to display a lower incidence of connections. A good legal regime should exhibit more transparency of regulation, uniform application of the law, and rigorous enforcement of penalties associated with violations of the law. This hypothesis is supported by the negative correlations in Table   IV .
A.4. Openness. (2003)). Thus, I expect connections to be more prevalent in countries with capital restrictions. The relevant coefficients in Table IV confirm that connections are more common in countries restricting capital outflows.
Cross-border restrictions
A.5. Democracy, freedom of press, education and economic development.
As a proxy for democracy, I use democratic in all years since 1950, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if (i) the executive is elected; (ii) the legislature (or at least its lower house) is elected;
(iii) more than one party contests elections; and (iv) during the last three elections of the executive there has been at least one turnover of power between parties. This variable is taken from Daniel Treisman (2000) . Democratic systems might serve to discourage connections, because political opponents have an incentive to discover and publicize abuses of office. Further, connections may be seen as less valuable if officials can be voted out.
The press freedom index measures the extent of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and of the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected, as measured by Reporters Without Borders. Increased freedom of press should discourage connections since it encourages the detection and punishment of abuses. However, as with any other transparency variable, we may uncover a positive association between the freedom of press and connections if more transparent systems are in general better able to tolerate connections because a misuse would be more likely to be punished. Furthermore, a positive mechanical association would result if connections are easier to detect in more transparent economies.
school enrollment, is the proportion of children of official secondary school age (as defined by the country) enrolled in school to the population of that age. I also use the natural log of per capita GDP, Ln{GDP (per capita)}, as a proxy for economic development (see Mauro (1995) and Treisman (2000)).
We may see fewer connections in more developed countries, as the benefits of being close to politicians may be smaller there. On the other hand, more developed countries may be more transparent, so that a higher proportion of connections that exist are included in the sample because they are easier to detect in more transparent economies.
B. Regression results
Using regressions based on a two-boundary Tobit specification, I test the significance of the relations between the connections variables and the independent variables. In Table V, model (1),
shows that corruption is positively and significantly associated with the connections index. This finding is intriguing, and indicates three possible explanations. First, it may be that in some countries corruption is not helpful enough to obtain significant benefits, so businessmen need to become personally involved in politics in order to "squeeze the state." Alternatively, it may be the case that corruption emerges as a response to political connections if companies without political connections need to bribe politicians in order to obtain the minimum benefits necessary to ensure the survival of the firm. Third, it may be that my measure of connections is a proxy for corruption, which is observable at the firm level. Model (2) shows that connections are less common in countries with better legal environments. This result, however, lacks statistical significance.
[ Table V goes about here] Model (3) shows that countries that restrict foreign financial investment by residents have a significantly higher incidence of political connections. Democratic governments are associated with a higher incidence of connections, but the relationship is not statistically significant (Model 4). Similarly, greater freedom of press is associated with a higher incidence of connections. This result may be due to the fact that democracies and more transparent systems are in general better able to tolerate connections because a misuse would be more likely to be punished. The result could also be explained because it is easier to identify connections in more transparent economies. 13 This result is confirmed by the finding in Model (5) that better education is associated with more connections. Model (5) also shows that more developed countries display an insignificantly lower incidence of connections. Finally, Model (6) indicates that restrictions on connections are, as one would expect, associated with fewer connections.
The mandatory disclosure of assets is also associated with fewer connections.
Several of the explanatory variables are highly correlated with one another, and it would be difficult to disentangle their individual effects. Thus, I further assess the validity of the results using a stepwise procedure, adding independent variables one at a time until the best regression model is obtained. Most of the results continue to hold for the stepwise approach in model (7) . Corruption, for example, continues to be positively associated with connections. Similarly, connections remain more common in countries that restrict foreign financial investment by residents. Connections are less common in the presence of more restrictive regulations. They remain more common in more transparent systems, such as democracies, and in countries with higher secondary school enrollment. Model (9) shows that these results are generally robust to changes in the incidence of connections variable; this model uses % of firms connected with a minister or MP, the more objective measure of connections. A difference between models (9)-(10) and model (6) is that using the last proxy for connections, I find a positive association between the mandatory disclosure of assets dummy, and the incidence of connections. However, this association is never significant at conventional levels.
The coverage of the Worldscope data set is such that more firms are included for some countries than for others. A way to minimize Worldscope sampling issues is to focus on the largest firms in each country. I therefore use the variable % of top 50 firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship, which is the incidence of connections amongst the largest 50 firms in each country. For countries with less than 50 firms in the sample, this fraction is computed based on the available companies. In model (11) , countries that restrict foreign financial investment by residents continue to display a significantly higher incidence of connections. Similarly, more transparent systems (e.g., those with a more educated population) are associated with a higher presence of political connections.
Finally, restrictions on political connections are associated with a significantly lower proportion of connections.
For a further check of the robustness of my results, I exclude countries with limited data coverage in Worldscope (see footnote 7) . All variables maintain the signs displayed in Model (7), although only corruption and the regulatory score remain significant at conventional levels. Finally, I also employ the International Country Risk Guide corruption index. Results reported in Table V , continue to hold when using this alternative proxy for corruption. The statistical significance of the ICRG index is stronger than what reported for the German corruption index (see Models (8), (10) and (12)).
III. The value of connections.
To see whether connections add value, I run an event study around announcements of (i) directors or dominant shareholders entering politics, and (ii) politicians joining boards. If connections add value, announcements should be associated with a positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR).
Several factors limit the available sample. First, the dates of appointments and elections must be identifiable. I am able to identify the election dates in 572 cases. All international data sources covered in Lexis-Nexis, Reuters, The Financial Times, and The Economist allow identification of the dates of board appointments or of acquisition of ownership for only 328 cases. The lack of this data forces exclusion of many interesting connections, such as those involving several companies related to Suharto (who came to power in 1967), the King of Thailand, Mahathir, several Russian politicians, and anyone who came to power before press releases are available. Second, it must be possible to verify whether a particular politician was a director ahead of time, as well as whether someone later appointed a director was already a politician at that time. Application of this requirement reduces the sample to 296 observations. Third, stock price series must be available on Datastream or Bloomberg, which reduces the sample to 245 observations.
There will be a stock price reaction to an election only if the outcome is uncertain. In a number of cases, the outcome of an election was easy to call in advance. To deal with anticipation, I search articles in Lexis-Nexis for discussions about the expected outcome of the elections. Whenever I find articles stating that the leading party is certainly going to obtain the majority in the parliament (for example, in the November 1999 Malaysian elections, the leading party was expected to obtain above two thirds of the seats in the parliament), or has a margin of more than 5 percentage points over the opposition, I connection through a member of the parliament results in a value increase of "only" 1.23%, a connection with a minister or a close relationship results in an average value increase of 13.42% (Panel   D) . Finally, Panel E shows that connections create more value in countries with relatively high corruption (i.e., those with a German corruption index above the sample median) than in countries with low corruption; the average CARs for these two sub-samples are of 6.01% and 1.08%, respectively.
Median tests indicate that the results are not driven by outliers.
IV. Conclusion.
In this paper I build a completely new measure of political connections for over 20,000 listed companies from 47 countries. I define a company as politically connected if one of its large shareholders or top directors is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party. Overall, 541 firms are politically connected, representing almost 8% of the world's market capitalization. I find that political relationships are not equally common across countries.
Connections are particularly common in countries with higher levels of corruption, countries imposing restrictions on foreign investments by their residents, and countries with more transparent systems.
Connections are less common in countries with regulations that set more rigorous limits on political conflicts of interest.
I also find that different relationships between business people and politicians have different value.
No significant price effect is detected for appointments of politicians to corporate boards. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that politicians extract rents from companies they manage (De Soto, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), and that in equilibrium the costs of connections may well offset their benefits. However, stock prices increase significantly when a businessperson enters politics, suggesting that rent seeking is, as one might expect, much less of a problem in this case. Additionally, firm value increases more when a businessperson is elected as prime minister, rather than as member of the parliament. Notice that not all businesspeople can succeed in becoming prime minister, because these positions are very limited in number. The chance of being elected as a member of parliament is certainly greater, but the event study results show that the impact associated with connections with MPs is relatively modest. Still, almost 30% of Canadian MPs are active in business! Connections with MPs include firms whose controlling shareholder or top director of the company sits in a national parliament. Connections with ministers include firms with a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the voting stock or a top director who holds a government office, is king or president of the country. Closely related firms are those with a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the voting stock or a top director who has a close relationship with at least one top politician. Close relationships include: (i) friends, (ii) former heads of state or prime ministers (and their relatives), (iii) current politicians who have left the firm after 1997, (iv) foreign politicians, and (v) well-known cases of relationships with political parties. Connections through owner include those cases in which a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the firm's voting stock sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is the head of state, or is closely related to a top politician or political party. Connections through top director include those cases in which a company's top director sits in a national parliament, holds office in the government, is the head of state, or is closely related to a top politician or political party. No. of firms with available data is the number of firms included in Worldscope. No. of firms connected with a minister or MP is the number of firms with a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the voting stock or a top director who is a member of parliament or government, excluding close relationships. % of firms connected with a minister or MP is the number of firms connected with a minister or MP as a proportion of the total number of firms in a given country. No. of firms connected with a minister, MP, and close relationships is the number of firms with a shareholder controlling at least 10% of the voting stock or a top director who is a member of parliament or government, plus all identified cases of close relationships. % of firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship is the number of all connected firms as proportion of the total number of firms in a particular country. % of top 50 firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship is the number of connected firms as proportion of the largest 50 firms (based on end of 1997 market capitalization) in a particular country. For countries with less than 50 firms in the sample, this fraction is computed based on the available companies. Total number of connections is the overall number of connections identified in a given country. If two directors of the same company sit as ministers, the number of connections would be two, while the number of connected firms would be one. Ownership and directorship denote whether the company is connected through the owner or through a top director.
Of which: % of firms connected with a minister or MP is the ratio of firms connected with a minister or MP as a proportion of the total number of firms in a given country. % of firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship is the number of all connected firms as a proportion of the total number of firms in a particular country. % of top 50 firms connected with a minister or MP, or a close relationship is the number of connected firms as proportion of the largest 50 firms (based on end of 1997 market capitalization) in a particular country. For countries with less than 50 firms in the sample, this fraction is computed based on the available companies. German Corruption is the German exporters' corruption index developed by Neumann (1994) . The index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher scores denoting higher levels of corruption. Corruption ICRG is the International Country Risk Guide's assessment of the corruption in government Higher scores indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans." Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10; the original scale is inverted so that lower scores correspond to lower levels of corruption. (Source: La Porta et al., 1998). Quality of legal environment is the average between efficiency of the judicial system and rule of law. Efficiency of the judicial system is an assessment of the "efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms" produced by the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation. It "may be taken to represent investors' assessments of conditions in the country in question." Average between 1980-1983. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for lower efficiency levels (Source: Mauro, 1995 (1) the executive is elected, (2) the legislature (at least its lower house) is elected, (3) more than one party contests elections, and (4) during the last three elections of the executive there has been at least one turnover of power between parties (Source: Treisman, 2000). Press freedom index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. Reporters Without Borders sent out a questionnaire based on the main criteria for such freedom and asking for details of directs attacks on journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical assaults and threats) and on the media (censorship, confiscation, searches and pressure). It also asked about the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for such violations. The index of press freedom is a portrait of the situation based on events between September 2001 and October 2002. Scale from 0 to 100, with lower scores for more freedom. : Table III ). Mandatory disclosure of assets is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if government officials are required to declare personal assets, and zero otherwise (Source: 
